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This report analyzes the effects of merger and 
acquisition activity on urban hierarchy. This paper shows 
that firms from larger metropolitan areas are more often the 
predator in a merger and acquisition transaction. The 
larger the metropolitan area the stronger these tendencies. 
The analytical tool of logistic regression is used to 
calculate the log likelihoods and odds ratios. The paper 
concludes with an examination of the possible adverse 
complications resulting from the M&A trend.
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MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH URBAN HIERARCHY
Introduction.
The U.S. economy of the 1980s has seen the highest 
level of mergers and acquisitions since the late 1960s. 
Consequently, many regions have experienced serious, 
although somewhat silent, economic repercussions. The 
generally positive economic illustration painted in the 
1980s shields many regional inequalities.
During the 1980s many communities experienced economic 
dislocations from the merger and acquisition process. 
Businesses were closed, plants relocated and local services 
terminated. Little attention, in the literature, has been 
given to the relationship of M&A activity and urban 
hierarchy. In recent years, the majority of the M&A 
literature has focused on the value of both the acquiring 
(predator) and the acquired (target) firms (Franks, Harris, 
Mayer 1988), and on the social impact of the merger trend in 
general (Auerbach 1988, Groshen 1989).
In this paper we are concerned with the relationship 
between metropolitan size and corporate takeovers. We 
present evidence which supports two hypotheses. First, 
firms headquartered in larger metropolitan areas are more 
often the predator of firms from smaller cities. In other
2
words, the merger and acquisition process is causing 
corporate headquarters to move up the urban hierarchy. 
Second, we examine this trend holding company size 
constant.
In the first chapter we review the literature on 
spatial aspects of corporate headquarter location. The 
diverse advantage of metropolitan orientation in M&A 
activity is examined and supporting empirical evidence is 
introduced. The second chapter is devoted to the 
presentation of the data and the analytical models used for 
this exploration. The third chapter discusses the economic, 
spatial, and policy issues of this progressive merger trend.
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CHAPTER ONE
Literature review of corporate office location.
1.1 Corporate headquarter affinity to metropolitan 
locations.
The modern day business environment consists of a 
network of individual organizations each performing 
specialized tasks. Additionally, any single firm can be 
shown to be connected to all other elements in the system 
through links of formal and informal informational channels. 
Further, these organizations are controlled by a very broad 
(horizontal) system of financial-legal corporate linkages 
(Karaska 1978). Recent studies (Eckstein 1986) have shown 
these "external" influences are likely to influence short­
term profits at least as much as the tactical decisions made 
by management. Therefore, if an organization is going to be 
competitive within a capitalistic framework, it must 
structure itself to take advantage of all internal and 
external information channels. Many modern business firms 
access this advantage by headquartering in larger 
metropolitan areas (Armstrong 1978, Daniels 1982, Blair 
1990).
The tendency for office activities to concentrate in 
particular regions of developed countries has long been 
apparent. There is a definite affinity between office
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activity and large urban centers (Alexander 1979). In 1974, 
59 percent of the Fortune 500 U. S. industrial companies 
were headquartered in the ten major cities. The main 
concentration was dominated by New York and Chicago.
This spatial pattern is not unique to the United 
States. Johnson (1966) shows that Australian headquarters 
tended to locate in Sydney and Melbourne. New Zealand is 
dominated by Auckland, Christchurch, Wellington and Dunedin 
(Johnson and Rimmer 1967). Sweden is lead by Stockholm 
(Tornqvist 1970). The U.K. is dominated by London with 60 
percent of the top 500 industrial company headquarters 
(Daniels 1975). Certainly the dominance of London is 
particularly outstanding; its nearest rival is the West 
Midlands conurbation and it accounts for a mere 5 percent 
(Evans 1973).
This uneven distribution of office activity at a 
national level is largely attributable to the clustering of 
activity at different levels of organizational hierarchy 
(Alexander 1979). Armstrong (1972) stratifies a company's 
offices into three levels: the headquarters, the middle 
market and the local market; each of these levels can be 
shown to have independent locational preferences. Local 
offices (a branch bank or local real estate agent) are more 
widely distributed than an office serving an entire region 
or city (the middle market) and tends to provide a lower 
level service. The corporate headquarters services an 
entire country or group of countries and provides higher
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order services (long range planning etc.) The number of 
units at each level diminishes as one ascends this hierarchy 
(Alexander 1978).
A number of studies have examined corporate structure 
and its impact of regional office locational patterns. 
Alexander (1978) states:
The geographical distribution of office 
activity and contact patterns at a regional level 
is also affected by company structure: the
orientation contacts, associated with the setting 
of organizational goals, are largely the preserve 
of head offices ... These offices are particularly 
concentrated in major urban areas. They are 
likely to have under their control offices and 
other company or organization units in locations 
outside the major urban centers. Thus decisions 
made in one location will have consequences in 
many locations.
Goddard (1978) explained:
Regional concentration occurs especially in 
office-type jobs in which individuals are
principally involved in the processing of 
information within the organization and its
exchange between organizations using personal 
contact. This has important social implications 
for social mobility and migration and significant 
economic implications for development and change 
which are steered by the diffusion of new
information.
1.2 Cause for Metropolitan Concentration - Knowledge Base
There are many theories for this urban clustering, and 
we will focus on the factors which can be broadly called 
knowledge base factors. Pred (1977) describes the 
concentration of business knowledge as follows:
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"Spatial biases in the circulation of private 
information have traditionally arisen because of 
the time and monetary costs associated with 
acquisition. Nearby private information has 
always been more cheaply obtained than distant 
private information. Thus the uniquely detailed 
total array of contacts - or 'informational 
field'- surrounding an individuals or groups place 
of work or residence has always been inclined to 
decrease in density with increasing distance... 
Constant improvements in transportation and 
communications technology have tended to diminish, 
but by no means eliminate the 'distance decay', or 
density fall-off of private information contact 
networks or fields.
More specifically, firms located in higher order urban 
places have better access to specialized business related 
services. Metropolitan locations also offer more 
opportunities for face-to-face contacts which play a large 
role in the M&A process. Multilocational firms demand 
interurban linkages and these are more prevalent in larger 
metropolitan locations.
1.2.1 Availability of Related Business Services.
Any significant merger and acquisition program will 
require the attention of a group of senior management 
(located at the corporate headquarters) who will devote a 
significant amount of time to the project. This group 
should include representatives of the legal, financial, and 
strategic planning functions, and must have the confidence 
of the CEO and key board members (Briggs and Higgins 1986). 
The acquisition team will likely consist of strategic 
planning consultants, and investment bankers who specialize
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in structuring and negotiating the deal. As the size of the 
deal increases, additional expertise may be required. The 
team may expand to include public relations firms, lawyers 
specializing in regulatory and tax considerations, or 
external financial advisors. Hines and Chrenc (1986) state 
that M&A decisions will outclass the personal of all but the 
largest, most specialized, U.S. corporations.
Central corporate headquarters make extensive use of 
specialized services which many firms find too expensive to 
produce themselves (Goddard 1978). Friedland (1983) states 
that as business services become more specialized, the 
service firms are more likely to agglomerate in large 
central cities where corporate demand is extensive.
Goddard (1978) explains:
"Uncontrollable external economies arise from 
information flows in which no monetary 
transactions are directly involved: for example,
information about new markets, suppliers or 
production processes on which the long-run 
survival of the organization might depend. This 
information , while vital to the spread of growth 
inducing innovations may (though not necessarily) 
flow along the established network of 
interdependences within and between organizations. 
Substantial advantages accrue from location in an 
agglomeration where complexes of interlinked 
functions are found. Because of the steep 
distance decay effect on flows of specialist 
information, the industrial complex or growth pole 
has more meaning as a spatial concept.11
Gad's (1979) study of the linkages in Toronto's Central 
Corridor documents much of this service agglomeration. The 
study clearly shows the participants in M&A activity have a 
very high percentage of links within the Central Corridor 
and consequently export little of their knowledge.
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Table 1.2
Selected M/A participant's 
Linkage Characteristics of Gad's Model
Percent of







Public Relations Consultants 69.3
Accountants/Management 51.0
Market Research Firms 47.9
Another example of information clustering is seen in 
the M&A Directory compiled by Corporate Finance (August 
1989). This directory shows the highest concentration of 
M&A specialists is in New York City. In fact, New York City 
contains 79 firms (47% of the total firms listed). The next 
highest concentration is Chicago with 11, followed by Los 
Angeles with 8 . Philadelphia has 7, and San Francisco has 
5. Of the 39, cities listed 30 contain only 1 or 2 M&A 
firms.
While firms located in smaller metropolitan areas may 
still have access to these special services, such services 
will be more difficult to obtain because of distance 
barriers, and the services may be of lower quality because 
of fewer face-to-face contacts (Blair & Endres 1990).
Britton (1978) showed that non-metropolitan single plant 
firms receive lower quality of service inputs. Further, in
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less accessible locations high-order service input are 
supplied by low-order business to firms unaware of the 
opportunities available in nearby towns (Goddard 1975). In 
Norway, for example, it has been observed that management 
tends to use low-order services functions to provide high- 
level services; a local bank manager is asked to give advice 
on long range financial planning.
This service agglomeration supports the hypothesis of 
firms from larger metropolitan areas being more active in 
M&A activity. The availability of specialized M&A 
information makes it easier for these firms to use the 
technique of acquisition to reach their long range growth or 
divesture goals.
1.2.2 Face-to-Face Contacts.
Many top corporate office employees spend half of their 
working week exchanging information (Stewart, 1967). Much 
of this exchange is in the form of face-to-face contacts.
As the profitability of information increases, corporate 
offices become more sensitive to its locational costs 
(Friedland 1983).
The volume of public information is too immense for 
corporate officials to monitor comprehensively. Corporate 
executives, therefore, must rely on face-to-face 
interorganizational networks to alert them to potentially 
relevant public or private information (Friedland 1983).
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Because they transmit more information than telephone or 
written exchanges, face-to-face communications are vital 
(Evans 1985). They also build trust between the parties 
(Blair and associates 1990) and allow for nonverbal 
communication.
The sensitive nature of the M&A transaction tends to 
lead to face-to-face contacts. Identifying and gathering 
information on privately held companies, including 
subsidiaries of public companies, is virtually impossible to 
do from the outside (Briggs and Higgans 1986). Face-to-face 
contacts is the norm for these types of negotiations.
1.2.3 Intermetropolitan Linkages.
As multilocational firms increase in number, the need 
for intermetropolitan information links also increases.
Firms must maintain linkages with their spatially separated 
branch plants. Larger metropolitan areas have the 
infrastructure and business services required for this 
communication.
Pred (1977) emphasizes the role of superior air- 
passenger services in headquarter location. The 
availability of non-stop flights can greatly reduce the 
costs of transportation for highly paid, contact oriented 
employees. Direct flights can also reduce the need for 





In this chapter we will present evidence supporting our 
hypothesis that firms from larger cities are more often 
predators in M&A transactions. We will then take this one 
step further and show that even if the size of the firms is 
held constant, the hypothesis holds true. Section 2.1 is a 
brief overview of the logistic regression model used and is 
presented only as a cursory synopsis. It is not the intent 
of this section to present a detailed examination of 
logistic regression. Interested readers are directed to the 
literature (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989, Ashton 1972). Section
2.2 is a presentation of the data used for this 
investigation. Section 2.3 presents the logistic models and 
analyses and is followed by section 2.4 which continues the 
research, holding firm size constant.
2.2 Introduction to Logistic Regression.
The goal of any economic model building is always the 
same: To find the best fitting and most parsimonious, yet 
economically reasonable model to describe the relationship 
between the outcome (dependent) variable and a set of 
independent variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989).
Historically, the cornerstone of any econometric model 
has been the technique of regression analysis. Regression
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analysis is concerned with the problem of describing or 
estimating the value of one variable (dependent variable 
traditionally coded Y) on the basis of one or more other 
variables (independent variables traditionally coded X).
Typically, this relationship is assumed linear in function 
because it is mathematically simple, yet still approximates 
the real world. A significant limitation of linear 
regression, for our analysis, is its limitation of an 
outcome variable that is assumed continuous. In this paper 
the analysis demands an outcome variable that is dichotomous 
or binary.
In our study the method of analysis will be that of 
logistic regression. What distinguishes a logistic 
regression model from a linear regression model is that the 
outcome variable is dichotomous or binary. In other words, 
logistic regression allows us to model the analysis so that 
the results may be coded within a yes or no framework.
In order to simplify notation, we will use the quantity 
n ( x )  = E(Y|x) to represent the conditional mean of Y given X 
when the logistic distribution is used. The specific form 
of the logistic regression model we will use is as follows:
( 2 . 1 ) Y — ^0 B^X^ &2x 2
( 2 . 2 )
7r(x)
1 + e 0B q +B^ j x̂
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A transformation of i r ( x ) that will be central to our 
use of logistic regression is the logit transformation.
This transformation is defined, in terms of tt(x ), as 
follows:
(2.3) tf(x)
g(x) = In [ ____________ ]
1 - 7T(X)
= J3q + R^x
The importance of this transformation is that g(x) has many 
of the desirable properties of a linear regression model.
The logit, g(x) is linear in its parameters, may be 
continuous, and may range from -« to +«, depending on the 
range of x.
The LOGIST procedure in the SAS statistical package was 
selected for this work. The procedure LOGIST, uses the 
above transformations and provides understandable yet 
computationally complete results. An extended examination 
of LOGIST is not within the scope of this work and readers 
are referred to the SUGI Supplemental Library User's Guide 
(1986). For interpretation of the model results we can use 
the following synopsis by Harrell (1986):
"...Appropriate intercept terms are included 
in each model. If you do not request the STEPWISE 
option, LOGIST calculates MLEs (maximum-1ikelihood 
estimates) for the parameters associated with each 
independent variable. The covariance matrix of 
the MLEs is obtained by inverting the observed 
information matrix evaluated at the MLEs. The MLE 
chi-square statistic (Wald statistic) for testing 
the hypothesis that a parameter is zero is
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calculated by computing the parameter estimate 
divided by its standard error and squaring the 
result. The standard error is estimated by 
calculating the square root of the appropriate 
diagonal element of the estimated covariance 
matrix. This hypothesis test assumes the
estimators are asymptotically distributed...”
Additional model characteristics will be introduced within 
the data interpretations in sections 2 .4 and 2.5.
2.3 Data.
The data selected for this study was taken from the 
Mergers & Acquisitions data base maintained by the Automatic 
Data Processing Corporation. The M&A database contains some 
140 characteristics including, company name, SIC code, deal 
value, and revenues of the firms. This ADP data base is the
source file for the M & A  Roster reported in the U.S.
Mergers and Acquisitions journal.
To qualify for inclusion in the U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions data, a transaction must be valued at $1 
million dollars or more. Partial acquisitions of 5 percent 
or more of a company's stock are included if the $1 million 
dollar threshold is met. Sales of real property are not
included, and if the price has not been revealed, the




The purpose of this first investigation is to prove the 
following hypothesis:
HQ = Firms from larger cities are more often 
the predator of firms from smaller 
cities in merger and acquisition 
transactions.
We will begin our study with a functional form as follows:
(2.4) P = f( SP, R)
where:
P = Predator in a transaction. The variable is 
dichotomous in structure and coded 
l=predator,0=target.
SP = SMSA population of the firms city.
R = Revenue of the firm.
The above function shows we believe the probability of being 
a predator is a function of SMSA size and company revenue. 
While our HQ is only concerned with city size, the revenue 
variable was added to examine any confounding effects.
The revenue variable is meant to indicate the size of 
the firm. A more appropriate measure of firm size would 
have been a measure of net assets. An M&A transaction 
represents an investment transaction, and net asset value is
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the traditional measure of a firm's investment levels. 
Unfortunately, the data was not available for all the 
companies in the dataset and revenue was selected as a proxy 
variable. Revenue is more subject to cyclical variations 
than net assets, but if we assume that the effects of any 
cyclical impact will be felt uniformly across the entire 
database this should pose no problem.
Now that the above relationships have been established, 
we can create a logistic regression equation by substituting 
our parameters into equation 2.2 as follows:
(2.5) g(P) = 6 0 + %(SP) + B2 (R)
At this point, it is important to remember the purpose of 
the analysis. Our goal is not to provide a model which 
"forecasts" merger activity, but to test the HQ of city size 
significance. Thus, we are interested in showing that the 
6  ̂coefficient in our equation 2.4 is not equal to zero 
(demonstrating significance). Furthermore, we also wish to 
show the 62 coefficient is positive if g(P)=l exhibiting a 
positive relationship between population size and the 
probability of being a predator.
The data set selected (see appendix A) contains 100 
observations of mergers selected randomly from U.S. Merger 
and Acquisitions between 1986 and third quarter 1988. The 
observations contain 50 predator and 50 target firms.
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The first step was to calculate the simple statistics 
of the data and the results are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 
Simple Statistics
Variable Mean Min. Max. S.D.
SMSAPOP 3181386 111270 9120346 3139591
REVENUE1 952026 330 14790000 2207517
notes: ■’•Revenues listed in thousand dollars.
One interesting observation in table 2.1 is the mean 
population size of all the firms in the sample. A mean of 
3,181,386 puts the average population easily within the top 
ten SMSAs in the country. This supports the Blair and 
Endres (1990) hypothesis of firms from larger SMSAs often 
being more active in M&A activity. While this is an 
interesting observation, it tells us little about how city 
size relates to predator activity. To do this we must run 
the regressions on the data set.
After the calculation of the simple statistics, we 
performed univarient analysis on each of the two variables.
A univarient analysis is performed, first, to establish the 
relationships of the independent variables and the dependent 
variables without any confounding or interfering effects. If 
the strength of the relationship is weakened by introducing
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the other independent variables, it may be wise to eliminate 
the problem variable. We will begin with our critical 
variable of population size. Table 2.2 contains the results 
for the population variable.
Table 2.2 
Univarient Results of SMSA Model
Variable Beta Std. Error Beta/S.E
Intercept -.69509031 .29821994 -2.33
SMSAPOP .00000023 .00000007 3.28
Log-Like1ihood = 127.73
The maximum likelihood estimates of 6 0 and Bj. are thus seen 
to be J3q= -.69509031 and 6 -̂ = .00000023 and the estimated 
logit is given by the equation:
(2.6) g(P) = -.69509031 + .00000023(SMSAPOP)
The Wald test for significance is obtained by comparing the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the slope parameter to the 
estimate of its standard error. The resulting ratio, under 
the assumption that = 0 , will follow a standard normal 
distribution (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Table 2.2 shows a 
Wald ratio for SMSAPOP of 3.28 and the two tail p-value is 
P(|Z|>3.28), where Z denotes a random variable following the
19
standard normal distribution. This indicates a significance 
for the SMSAPOP coefficient of .99.
We can, similarly, perform the above analysis on the 
REVENUE variable. The results are presented in table 2.3.
Table 2.3
Univarient Results for Revenue Variable REVENUE.
Variable Beta Std. Error Beta/S.E.
Intercept -.60026217 .25243477 2.37
REVENUE .00000114 .00000038 3.00
Log likelihood = 117.12
The coefficient for REVENUE is also significant at the .99 
level.
Now that the univarient analysis is complete, we can 
combine the variables into a model represented by our 





Variable Beta Std. Error Beta/s.E .
Intercept -.92084540 .31847321 -2.89
SMSAPOP .00000014 .00000008 1.75
REVENUE .00000092 .00000038 2.42
Log Likelihood = 114.08
When the combined model is examined, a number of things 
appear. The most significant of which is the drop in the 
population coefficient by nearly forty percent. This is 
evidence of the presence of a confounding effect.
Confounding exists when a variable is related to another 
independent variable as well as the dependent variable. In 
this instance it is clear that revenue and population are 
related. In a predictive model it may be useful to try to 
break this relationship with the use of an interaction term 
(in this case SMSAPOP * REVENUE). However, the 
corresponding results would not be significant to our test 
of the hypothesis. In this case we will simply drop the 
revenue term and concentrate on the univarient model of:
(2.7) g(P) = S0 + (SMSAPOP)
Returning to table 2.2 we can substitute the results into 
equation 2.6 to get:
( 2 . 8 ) g(P) = -.69509031 + .00000023(SMSAPOP)
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Equation 2.7 shows a coefficient which is positive and 
non-linear. This proves our hypothesis that firms from 
larger cities are more often the predator of firms from 
smaller cities, that is, the coefficient is non-zero and 
positive, showing a positive relationship between population 
size and the probability of being a predator. It may now be 
useful to examine this relationship in more detail.
The regression coefficients obtained through logistic 
regression indicate the effect of an individual variable on 
the log odds of the outcome event with all the remaining 
variables held constant. The coefficient denotes the 
magnitude of the increase or decrease in the log odds 
produced by one unit of change in the value of the 
regression variable. In our case, the coefficient of 
.00000023 indicates the log odds for a firm to be a predator 
in a M&A transaction increases by .00000023 for each person 
increase in SMSA population. The adjusted odds ratio is 
then e0,00000023 = 1.00000023.
While the effects of a one person increase in SMSA 
population doesn't seem economically interesting, the 
implications of the model can be overwhelming. To 
illustrate this let us take the two extreme SMSA populations 
in our study. Our smallest SMSA is Wausau WI. with a 
population of 111,270, and the largest is New York City with 
a population of 9,120,346. If we subtract the population of 
Wasau from the population of New York (9,120,346 -
22
111,270=9,009,076) and then multiply this by the beta 
coefficient in our model the result is the log odds 
difference (9,009,076 * .00000023 = 2.0720874). 
Exponentiation of this value indicates the adjusted odds 
ratio for a difference in the population sizes, or in our 
case e2 *0720874 = 7 .9 4 . Thus, our model suggests that if all 
other things are held constant, the firm from New York is 
7.94 times more likely to be a predator in a M&A transaction 
than the firm from Wasau WI.
Confidence intervals for this example can be estimated 
from the coefficient and the standard error. The standard 
error is also subject to the difference between the 
populations, thus, the 95% confidence interval limits are 
given by:
(2.9)
exp [difference * 6-^1 z1_ay2xSE(^i) ]
low = (9,009,076 * .00000023) - (1.96 * 9,009,076 *
.00000007) = .8360422
e.8360422 _ 2.307
high = (9,009,076 * .00000023) + (1.96 * 9,009,076 *
.00000007) = 3.308132707 
e3.308132707 = 27>33
resulting in:
2.307 < 7.94 < 27.33
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Thus, the odds ratio of 7.94 is well within the 95% 
confidence interval.
The above example using the largest and smallest
populations was selected because it provides the most
dramatic results. Admittedly, population differences in
transactions may not be of this magnitude. A more realistic
scale may be that of 500,000 intervals in population. This
results in an odds ratio of:
(2.10) 500,000 * .00000023 = .1150
e .1150 = 1 1 2
Thus, in a transaction where everything else is held 
constant, the firm from a SMSA which is 500,000 larger the 
odds are 1.12 times greater that the firm will be the 
predator.
2.5 Empirical Results From a Model Which Holds Firm Size 
Constant.
In section 2.4 we created a model in which the revenue 
of a firm was found to be a confounding variable and 
consequently eliminated. In this section our focus will be 
on a model which takes into account firm size by holding 
size constant in the data selection.
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The data for this model consists of thirty random 
transactions as reported by U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
between third quarter 1988 and second quarter 1989 (see 
appendix B). This data set has several important 
differences from the one used in section 2.4. First, the 
predators and targets were selected from the same 
transaction and second, the firms in each transaction were 
of similar size. The resulting data set contained sixty 
firms from thirty randomly selected transactions where each 
transaction was stratified into two like sized firms.
The reason was this selection method is twofold. First, 
it is our aim to eliminate any complications that may result 
from a mismatch in firm size. Larger, more capital rich 
firms have a much greater ability to acquire a smaller 
organization. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) showed that 
smaller firms have lower acquisition costs and thus 
facilitate ease of acquisition. Since this analysis is 
strictly concerned with city size, we therefore want to 
structure the model to eliminate size effects. Our second 
reason for employing matched pair data selection is to 
attempt to view city size affects on a transaction by 
transaction basis. By selecting both firms from a 
transaction, we are able to more closely examine the role of 
SMSA size on the individual M&A transaction.
This model will again use logistic regression with the 
logit transformation. Our goal is to create the simplest 
model to test the hypothesis. We simply wish to be able to
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say that firms from larger cities are more often the 
predator in an M&A transaction. The model in section 2.4 
can be used to examine the probabilities of predators from 
different SMSAs. This model is not designed for comparison; 
it is only designed to test the hypothesis in question.
In this model we examine each transaction and create a 
dichotomous (0 or 1) design variable for city size. If the 
firm is from the larger SMSA in the transaction, it is coded 
with a 1 and if the firm was from the smaller SMSA it was 
coded 0. This results in a model with a functional form of;
(2.11) P = f(LGCITY)
Where:
P = The predator in the transaction coded 
1 if the firm was the predator and 0 
if the firm was the target.
LGCITY = The firm from the larger SMSA in the 
transaction coded 1 for yes and 0 
for no.
This results in the logistic regression equation:
( 2 . 12 )
g(P) = S0 + 6 ^  LGCITY)
Normally it is common to calculate the simple statistics of 
the independent variables. With a dichotomous design 
variable, this would be of no use. We know that a variable 
bounded in the range of 0 to 1 the mean will be .5, the
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median will be 0 or 1 etc. Our first step is to enter the 
data into the regression model and calculate the results. 
The results are presented in table 2.5.
Table 2.5
Regression Results of the Dichotomous Design Variable
Variable Beta Std. Error Beta/S.E.
Intercept -0.54654371 .37886762 0000000
LGCITY 1.09308741 .53579972 0000000
Log Likelihood 78.86
The maximum likelihood estimates of Bq and 6 -̂ are seen to be 
£q = -.54654371 and = .55579972 and the estimated logit 
is given by the equation:
(2.13) g(P) = -.54654371 + 1.09308741(LGCITY)
In logistic regression with a dichotomous independent 
variable, the calculation of the log odds is simply the 
exponentiation of the beta coefficient. In this case the 
odds ratio is e^*09308741 or 3 0 . in other words, the odds 
of being a predator are three times greater if the firm
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comes from the larger SMSA in a given transaction. This is 
clear evidence supporting our hypothesis.
In testing for statistical significance a 95% 
confidence interval was constructed with the following form:
e x p ^  ± z 2_.cc/2 x S E ( % )
(2.14) exp(l.09308741 ± 1.96 (.53579972) = (1.04, 8.49)
We can see that our estimate of 3.0 is well within the 
limits of the interval and is thus significant at 95%. While 
this is the most parsimonious model we can build it clearly 
shows the role of city size in a M&A transaction.
Both the models of section 2.4 and section 2.5 support 
the city size theory. Chapter one presented many reasons 
for this phenomenon, and this chapter supported them with 
empirical evidence. In the next chapter we will explore the 
possible consequences of this merger and acquisitions trend.
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CHAPTER THREE
Spatial Consequences and Policy Implications.
3.1 Introduction.
The evidence presented in chapter two supports our 
hypothesis that firms headquartered in larger regions are 
more likely to be predators in the acquisition process while 
firms from smaller regions are more likely to be take-over 
targets. Consequently, corporate control tends to move up 
the urban hierarchy. As corporate headquarters shift away 
from smaller places there is an adverse affect on that 
region's economies. It is these adverse effects that are the 
focus of this chapter.
Much of the current literature, and certainly the 
present M&A public policy, concentrates on the effects upon 
individual firms. Generally the concern is with determining 
whether or not the firm or workers of that firm are better 
off after a merger or takeover. What this approach does not 
see is the detrimental regional implications to the target's 
economy. What current policy is missing is a focus on the 
dichotomous issue of efficiency vs equity.
This chapter will examine the spatial consequences of 
M&A activity with special emphasis on the equity vs 
efficiency issue. Section 3.2 defines efficiency and 
equity. Section 3.3 highlights the possible impact on local
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political structure. Section 3.4 will examine the 
employment and income effects.
SECTION 3.1 Efficiency vs Equity in N&A Activity.
Much of the literature in regional economics is devoted 
to the study of growth and income distribution. One often 
reads statements, for example, that population movements 
from rural areas to urban centers should be discouraged for 
two reasons. First, urban centers are subject to diminishing 
returns as the result of congestion and other factors, and 
further movements of population to these centers are 
consequently inefficient. Second, these urban centers are 
already rich and powerful, whereas the out-migration from 
the rural areas is draining the countryside of its best 
young people, thereby increasing the inequality among 
regions (Alonso 1971). This disparity between the city and 
rural area can be extended to represent large metropolitan 
areas and smaller cities. As corporate control moves up the 
urban hierarchy, the regional inequality widens.
Efficiency is simply a goal of national economic 
growth. It is commonly accepted both at the level of 
political statements and technical analysis (Alonso 1971). 
The goal is generally accepted and specific statements are 
possibly about performance. These goals are intelligible to 
most people and thus affect political decisions.
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Equity, on the other hand, does not enjoy such clarity. 
Public policy accepts the desirability of assisting the less 
fortunate, but there is no commonly accepted basis of 
conventional or scientific wisdom on which to base 
operational judgements of need or performance. With the 
economic impacts of M&A so brazen (see Sec. 3.3 & 3.4), it 
is extraordinary that there has been so little technical 
discussion of the equity concern. With equity so central a 
concept of a political economy, the idea of fairness or 
social justice should not be alien.
3.2 M&A Impact on Political Structure.
In a political economy it is often difficult to 
distinguish many economic phenomena from other cultural 
catalysts, and the effects of M&A activity are no different. 
The shifting of corporate headquarters out of smaller 
regions can agitate the very foundation of a region's 
political culture.
Political culture is an amorphous concept, although 
some consensus exists on its general substance. A political 
culture is distinct from a political system, although some 
writers include beliefs and their compatible institutional 
structures under the same term (Knoke 1981). A political 
culture is primarily a shared psychological orientation 
toward political objects, a manifestation of the 
psychological and subjective dimensions of politics (Knoke
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1981). Like the general culture, a political culture is the 
product of a polity's history and the life history of the 
system's individual members. Political culture has been 
shown (Devine 1972) to persist, through political values, 
across generations in a socialization process. Thus, a 
political culture is more enduring and fixed than are 
individual opinions.
As firms in a given region are acquired and 
subsequently controlled by firms located elsewhere, many 
interesting things happen. Research on absentee-owned 
plants Shows that their executives tend to withdraw from 
local political participation (Noland 1962; French 1970).
It has been suggested that large national corporations, with 
their eyes on Wall Street and their fingers around the 
world, have better things to do with their time than to 
attend city hall (Friedland 1983). Typically, it was argued 
that the low level of political participation by corporate 
executives of nonheadquartered plants decentralizes the 
local structure of influence. In cities whose economies are 
absentee-owned, economic power is severed from political 
power. Comparative studies found that absentee ownership is 
associated with more diffuse local power structures (Aiken, 
1970). What this research shows is that through M&A 
activity the entire political structure, and ultimately, the 
underlying political culture can be exogenously changed.
With the rise of the multilocational firm, economic 
dominance has come to be synonymous with locational
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flexibility. Such dominant economic units have become less 
dependent on political participation to secure the policies 
they want. Their true power comes from their control over 
the flow of resources into and out of the city. With the 
rise of complex patterns of trade and production linking 
cities, large metropolitan centers come to dominate the 
lesser towns and rural areas whose production they organize 
(Lincoln and Friedland, 1978). Consequently, those economic 
units which are locationally dependent are the most likely 
to participate in local politics. We find local banks, 
newspapers and retailers to be more active in city politics 
than an executive of a nationally owned firm.
Beyond participation and government structure, the 
national corporations also draw on a "systemic" source of 
power, that of control over the dynamics of local economic 
growth (Friedland 1983). Hawley (1963) argued that cities 
whose economies have relatively few people exercising 
coordinative or managerial roles have a higher level of 
systemic power. He also showed that cities with high 
systemic power tend to have a greater output of political 
policies.
Turk (1970) was the first to show that a concentration 
of national headquarters of voluntary associations has a 
positive effect on the ability of a city to attract federal 
funds.
In summary, we can see that the M&A process can 
exogenously affect the local political culture and bring
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about devastating loss of local control. National firms can 
control many areas of political policy without any thought 
to local welfare. As corporations are acquired and 
consequently externally controlled, the local region loses a 
valuable pool of talent. Individuals who are executives in 
local organizations participate in more issues and have a 
greater reputation for power (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). 
Their source of power derives not from individual political 
participation, but from their position in the structure of 
inter-organizational relations in a city. Thus, as local 
firms are acquired by exogenous players local political 
participation diminishes.
3.4 Employment and Income Effects of M&A Activity.
While a grasp of the changes to a region's political 
structure are critical to the understanding of M&A effects, 
it is the income and employment effects which are the most 
visible, and consequently, get the most attention. The term 
"takeover" implies the transfer of managerial control from 
the acquired company to the acquiring. Spatially, control 
over a region's productive resources can be transferred to 
another region upon acquisition if the predator is 
headquartered elsewhere.
When a firm is acquired, high level central 
administrative functions such as financial, legal, and 
personnel frequently shift to the headquarter's location
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(Blair and Endres 1990). Leigh and North's 1978 study of 
British acquisitions explained:
A significant negative result of transfers of 
managerial control to the acquiring company is 
reduced executive and administrative white-collar 
employment and entrepreneurial incentive in the 
acquired firm's region. This is most severe when 
a full range of functions is transferred, as when 
the acquired firm becomes a branch plant, yet 
fully 40 percent of the takeovers involved actual 
transfer of key management from the acquired firm 
to the acquirer's headquarters.
Talton (1989) showed that Toledo's 20 percent decline in 
employment since 1986 was mainly attributed to corporate 
takeovers and restructuring. Catlin (1988), attributes Gary 
Indiana's declining employment to its decline in corporate 
headquarters.
The critical impact to the target region's economy can 
be measured by the degree of managerial control left to the 
acquired company. For example, if the target is intended to 
move the predator into a new product line, the predator 
generally values the expertise and knowledge of the target's 
management and leaves them relatively intact (Leigh and 
North 1978). This results in little or no impact on the 
local economy. In fact, the additional capital available 
from the parent may lead to future expansion and thus the 
local region is left better off. However, if the target is 
acquired in a horizontal acquisition, the firm is likely to 
be left with little real control and delegated to operate 
strictly as a branch plant location. If this happens, most
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if not all of the high level or professional jobs are 
shifted to the parent region and the target region is left 
with low level or semi-skilled production oriented 
employment. The worst case scenario is when the target firm 
is acquired and then liquidated with its assets being sold 
or distributed among the parent's subsidiaries.
Coupled with the actual employment loss experienced by 
the firm, the local service businesses may also be adversely 
affected. Leigh and North (1978) found that in 85 percent of 
the takeovers studied, the service linkages (financial, 
legal, insurance, advertising etc.) were shifted to the 
acquiring company's region. Local services were replaced 
with large "chain" professional organizations with 
headquarters in London and branches in larger provincial 
locations.
Britton's (1978) study of manufacturing firms in 
southern Ontario, showed that branches generally receive 
high order services from the parent company rather than from 
external sources. However, he also found that if the branch 
was located in Toronto, it had a higher degree of autonomy 
in its routine service selection thus supporting our concept 
of knowledge concentration (Section 1.2). Pred (1974) 
suggests that the higher level services located in the 
larger metropolitan areas is one of the chief external 
economies of these areas. It can also be argued to be a 
major factor in decreasing smaller cities' growth potential.
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The M&A process of shifting corporate control up the 
urban hierarchy results in a reduction in local service 
demand and a resulting reduction of the local supply of 
specialist services. This reduction is harmful to the 
peripheral regions structural employment balance and future 
growth potential. Britton (1978) found that most of the 
corporate service leakages from Ontario involved quaternary 
functions. Insofar as these jobs are concerned with 
innovation, information and decision making their reduction 
has significance for present and future occupational 
structure and viability of Canadian cities.
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CONCLUSION.
This paper has shown that firms located in larger urban 
areas are more often the predator in merger and acquisition 
activity. Logistic regression results indicate up to a 
seven times greater chance of being a predator if the firm 
is located in a larger location. This is the result of 
several efficiency agglomerations unigue to larger 
metropolitan locations. We have shown that large 
metropolitan locations are essentially "knowledge rich".
They have highly developed support linkages that are 
critical to the M&A process. They also provide critical 
face-to-face opportunities that may not be available in 
smaller regions.
The advantages of the larger areas have caused an M&A 
related outmigration from the smaller regions. This has 
resulted in many detrimental effects on the local economy 
and political structure of the region. Employment can be 
reduced and the local service economy diminishes.
Any public policy regarding M&A activity must be 
directed to reducing this inequity. Smaller, competitive 
firms whose profit margins and market power are low would 
benefit most from locational subsidies offered by localities 
and states. Unfortunately, the great bulk of industrial aid 
bonds and tax abatements are captured by the largest 
multilocational corporations.
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Case studies indicate that city governments mold public 
expenditures and taxation policies to promote economic 
growth within their boundaries (Friedland 1983). The M&A 
trend transcends local boundaries and lies in the realm of a 
national system of cities. The position of a city within 
the national system of cities is determined by the economic 
functions it performs for the dominant economic firms 
located within its boundaries. The dominance of the 
multilocational firm derives from its market power, scale, 
productivity and ability to generate investment funds 
internally. As national economic conditions change, cities 
in which multilocational firms are located may benefit from 
the superior capacity of those firms to adapt to such 




DATA SET FOR SECTION 2.4
Variable Name Code or Value
ID Transaction identification number.
P Predator or Target in the
transaction.
1 = Predator, 0 = Target
REVENUE Revenue of the firm.











































































































































































































DATA SET FOR SECTION 2.5
Variable Code or Value
ID Transaction Identification Number
P Predator of Target in the 
transaction. 1 = Predator, 
0 = Target.
SIC Firm's SIC Number
REVENUE Firm's Revenue in thousands.
SMSARANK Relative RAnking of the Firm's SMSA. 
Numbered from the largest to 
Smallest.
LGCITY Is the firm from the largest city in 




















































P SIC REVENUE SMSARANK LGCITY
(000)
1 20 5911046 67 0
0 20 3000000 8 1
1 22 72286 69 0
0 22 26000 63 1
1 36 39709 1 1
0 36 7000 55 0
1 39 1357895 41 1
0 39 504483 54 0
1 48 16438 44 1
0 48 53269 117 0
1 59 909312 8 1
0 59 389559 9 0
1 73 60000 10 1
0 73 12000 31 0
1 22 1317661 3 1
0 22 1703531 319 0
1 27 38001 27 0
0 27 20000 9 1
1 35 185373 20 1
0 35 49199 145 0
1 35 616494 19 1
0 35 771600 32 0
1 36 281150 163 0
0 36 65860 30 1
1 50 2062557 140 0
0 50 674500 16 1
1 54 634346 146 0
0 54 930439 35 1
1 73 79345 56 0
0 73 134000 19 1
1 87 3099600 28 1
0 87 600000 140 0
1 30 84158 21 1
0 30 56043 56 0
1 40 31029 2 1
0 40 20000 71 0
1 71 522518 1 1
0 71 345135 37 0
1 67 210335 31 1
0 67 186382 37 0
1 52 19764 21 0
0 52 12000 8 1
1 45 1835199 7 1
0 45 1865473 48 0
1 72 40000 26 0
0 72 34797 21 1
1 48 157373 111 0















P SIC REVENUE SMSARANK LGCITY
1 15 637116 1 1
0 15 180000 319 0
1 73 117400 6 1
0 73 62433 22 0
1 45 2689075 6 1
0 45 1221627 319 0
1 50 26922 21 1
0 50 9000 319 0
1 28 24607 10 1
0 28 11143 319 0
1 23 359814 319 0























































NEW YORK, NY-NJ 9 120 346
LOS ANGELES- LONG BEACH, CALIF 7 477 503
CHICAGO, IL 7 103 624
PHILADELPHIA, PA-NJ 4 716 818
DETROIT, MICH. 4 353 413
SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, CALIF. 3 250 630
WASHINGTON,D.C.-MD.-VA. 3 060 922
DALLAS-FORT WORTH, TX 2 974 805
HOUSTON, TX 2 905 353
BOSTON, MASS. 2 763 357
NASSAU-SUFFOLK, NY 2 605 813
ST. LOUIS, MO-IL 2 356 460
PITTSBURGH, PA 2 263 894
BALTIMORE, MD 2 174 023
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MINN-WIS 2 113 533
ATLANTA, GA 2 029 710
NEWARK, NJ 1 965 969
ANAHEIM-SANTO ANA-GARDEN GROVE, 1 932 709
CLEVELAND, OH 1 898 825
SAN DIEGO, CALIF. 1 861 846
MIAMI, FLA. 1 625 781
DENVER-BOULDER, COLO. 1 620 902
SEATTLE-EVERETT, WASH. 1 607 469
TAMPA-ST. PETERSBURG, FLA. 1 569 134
RIVERSIDE-SAN BERNARDINO-ONTARIO, CA.l 558 182
PHOENIX, ARIZ. 1 509 052
CINCINNATI, OH-KY-IND. 1 401 491
MILWAUKEE, WIS. 1 397 143
KANSAS CITY, MA-KANS. 1 327 106
SAN JOSE, CALIF. 1 295 071
BUFFALO, NY 1 242 826
PORTLAND, OREG-WASH. 1 242 594
NEW ORLEANS, LA. 1 187 073
INDIANAPOLIS, IND. 1 166 575
COLUMBUS, OH 1 093 316
SAN ANTONIO, TX 1 071 954
FORT LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD, FLA. 1 018 200
SACRAMENTO, CALIF. 1 014 002
ROCHESTER, NY 971 230
SALT LAKE CITY-OGDEN, UTAH 936 255
PROVIDENCE-WARWICK-PAWTUCKET, RI-MASS 919 216
MEMPHIS, TENN-ARK-MISS 913 472
LOUISVILLE, KY-IND. 906 152
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON, TENN 850 505
BIRMINGHAM, ALA. 847 487
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA. 834 088
DAYTON, OH 830 070
GREENSBORO-WINSTON-SALEM-HIGH PT, NC 827 252
NORFOLK-VIRG. BEACH-PORTSMOUTH, VA-NC 806 951




















































TOLEDO, OH-MICH 791 599
HONOLULU, HAWAII 762 565
JACKSONVILLE, FLA. 737 541
HARTFORD, CONN. 726 114
ORLANDO, FLA. 700 055
TULSA, OKLA. 689 434
AKRON, OH 660 328
SYRACUSE, NY 642 971
GARY-HAMMOND-EAST CHICAGO, IND. 642 781
NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA 640 396
CHARLOTTE-GASTONIA, NC 637 218
ALLENTOWN-BETHLEHEM-EATON, PA-NJ 635 481
RICHARD, VA 632 015
GRAND RAPIDS, MICH. 601 680
NEW BRUNSWICK-PERTH AMBOY-SAYREV1,NJ 595 893
WEST PALM BEACH-BOCA RATON, FLA 576 863
OMAHA, NEBR.-IOWA 569 614
GREENVILLE-SPARTANBURG, SC 569 066
JERSEY CITY, NJ 556 972
AUSTIN, TX 536 688
TUCSON, ARIZ 531 443
YOUNGSTOWN-WARREN, OH 531 350
RALEIGH-DURHAM, NC 531 167
SPRINGFIELD-CHICOPEE-HOLYOKE, MASS-Ct 530 668
OXNARD-SIMI VALLEY-VENTURA, CALIF 529 174
WILMINGTON, DEL-NJ-MD 523 221
FLINT, MICH. 521 589
FRESNO, CALIF. 514 621
LONG BRANCH-ASBURY PARK, NJ 503 173
BATON ROUGE, LA 494 151
TACOMA, WASH. 485 643
EL PASO, TX 479 899
KNOXVILLE, TENN. 476 517
LANSING-EAST LANSING, MICH. 471 565
LAS VEGAS, NEV. 463 087
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 454 499
PATERSON-CLIFTON-PASSAIC, NJ 447 585
HARRISBURG, PA 446 576
MOBILE, ALA. 443 536
JOHNSON CITY-KINGSPORT-BRISTOL, TN-VA 433 638
CHARLESTON-NORTH CHARLESTON, SC 430 462
CHATTANOOGA, TENN.- GA. 426 540
NEW HAVEN-W. HAVEN, CONN 417 592
WICHITA, KANS. 411 313
COLUMBIA, SC 410 088
CANTON, OH 404 421
BAKERSFIELD, CALIF. 403 089
BRIDGEPORT, CONN. 395 455
LITTLE ROCK- N. LITTLE ROCK, ARK 393 774

























































BEAUMONT-PORT ARTHUR-ORANGE, TX 
WORCESTER, MASS.
PEORIA, IL




DES MOINES, IOWA 
VALLEJO-FAIRFIELD-NAPA, CALIF 
AUGUSTA, GA-SC 










































































































































SALEM, OREG. 249 895
NEW LONDON-NORWICH, CONN.-RI 248 554
FAYETTEVILLE, NC 247 160
VISALIA-TULARE-PORTEVILLE, CALIF 245 738
POUGHKEEPSIE, NY 245 055
COLUMBUS, GA-ALA. 239 196
LOWELL, MASS.-NH 233 410
SAVANNAH. GA. 230 728
WATERBURY, CONN. 228 178
SAGINAW, MICH. 228 059
ROANOKE, VA 224 341
LIMA, OH 218 244
PROVO-OREM, UTAH 218 106
KILLEEN-TEMPLE, TX 214 656
LUBBOCK, TX 211 651
BROWNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO, TX 209 727
SPRINGFIELD, MO 207 704
FORT MYERS-CAPE CORAL, FLA. 205 266
FORT SMITH, ARK-OH 203 511
SARASOTA, FLA. 202 251
STAMFORD, CONN. 198 854
GALVESTON-TEXAS CITY, TX 195 940
ATLANTIC CITY, NJ 194 119
RENO, NEV. 193 623
LINCOLN, NEBR. 192 884
BILOXI-GULFPORT, MISS. 191 918
SANTA CRUZ, CALIF. 188 141
SPRINGFIELD, IL 187 789
BATTLE CREEK, MICH. 187 338
WHEELING, W. VA-OH 185 566
TOPEKA, KANS. 185 442
SALISBURY-CONCORD, NC 185 081
SPRINGFIELD, OH 183 885
PORTLAND, MAINE 183 625
MUSKEGON-NORTON SHR-MUSKEGON HGTS, MI 179 591
FAYETTEVILLE-SPRINGDALE, ARK 178 609
ASHEVILLE, NC 177 761
FALL RIVER, MASS.-RI 176 831
TERRE AHUTE, IND. 176 583
GREEN BAY, WIS. 175 280
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 174 431
AMARILLO, TX 173 699
RACINE, WIS. 173 132
BOISE CITY, IDAHO 173 036
YAKIMA, WASH. 172 508
BENTON HARBOR, MICH. 171 276
WACO, TX 170 755
CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA 169 775



















































BROCKTON, MASS. 169 374
CHAMPAIGN-URBANA-RANTOUL, IL 168 392
LAKE CHARLES, LA 167 223
PORTSMOUTH-DOVER-ROCHESTER, NH-MAINE 163 880
ST. CLOUD, MINN. 163 256
STEUBENVILLE-WEIRTON, OH-W. VA 163 099
PARKERSBURG-MARIETTA, W. VA- OH 162 836
MANCHESTER, NH 160 767
TALLAHASSEE, FLA. 159 542
LYNCHBURG, VA 153 260
ALEXANDRIA, LA 151 985
LONGVIEW-MARSHALL, TX 151 752
JACKSON, MICH. 151 495
GAINESVILLE, FLA. 151 348
CLARKSVILLE-HOPKINSVILLE, TENN-KY 150 220
LAFAYETTE, LA 150 017
FORT COLLINS, COLO. 149 184
BRADENTON, FLA. 148 442
BREMERTON, WASH. 147 152
DANBURY, CONN. 146 405
RICHLAND-KENNEWICK-PASCO, WASH 144 469
CHICO, CALIF. 143 851
NEW BRITAIN, CONN. 142 241
JANESVILLE-BELOIT, WIS. 139 420
ANDERSON, IND. 139 336
WILMINGTON, NC 139 248
MONROE, LA 139 241
ABALINE, TX 139 192
WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS, IOWA 137 961
FARGO-MOORHEAD, N. DAK.- MINN. 137 574
TUSCALOOSA, ALA 137 541
ELKHART, IND. 137 330
ALTOONA, PA 136 621
FLORENCE, ALA. 135 065
ANDERSON, SC 133 235
VINELAND-MILLVILLE-BRIDGETON, NJ 132 866
MEDFORD, OREG. 132 456
DECATUR,IL 131 375
MANSFIELD, OH 131 205
EAU CLAIRE, WIS. 130 932
WICHITA FALLS, TX 130 664
HICKORY, NC 130 207
ATHENS, GA 130 015
PETERSBURG-COLONIAL HGTS-HOPEWELL,VA 129 296
MUNCIE, IND. 128 587
TYLER, TEX 128 366
SHARON, PA 128 299
JOPLIN, MO 127 513
TEXARKANA, TEX-TEXARKANA, ARK 127 019




















































PUEBLO, COLO 125 972
OLYMPIO, WASH. 124 264
GREELEY, COLO. 123 438
KENOSHA, WIS. 123 137
OCALA, FLA. 122 488
LAFAYETTE-WEST LAFAYETTE IND. 121 702
NEWARK, OH 120 981
BAY CITY, MICH. 119 881
ANNISTON, ALA. 119 761
BLOOMINGTON-NORMAL, IL 119 149
WILLIAMSPORT, PA 118 416
PASCAGOULO-MASS POINT, MISS. 118 015
SIOUX CITY, IOWA-NEBR. 117 457
REDDING, CALIF. 115 715
ODESSA, TX 115 374
NASHUA, NH 114 221
BURLINGTON, VT 114 070
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA 113 568
HAGERSTOWN, MD 113 086
JACKSONVILLE, NC 112 784
STATE COLLEGE, PA. 112 760
LAWTON, OKLA. 112 456
ALBANY, GA 112 402
DANVILLE, VA 111 789
WAUSAU, WIS. 111 270
FLORENCE, SC 110 163
FORT WALTON BEACH, FLA. 109 920
GLENS FALLS, NY 109 649
SIOUX FALLS, S. DAK. 109 435
BILLINGS, MONT. 108 035
CUMBERLAND, MD-W. VA 107 782
ROCK HILL, SC 106 720
BELINGHAM, WASH. 106 701
KOKOMO, IND. 103 715
GADSDEN, ALA. 103 057
KANKAKEE, IL 102 926
YUBA CITY, CALIF. 101 979
ST. JOSEPH, MO 101 868
GRAND FORKS, N. DAK.-MINN. 100 944
SHEBOYGAN, WIS. 100 935
COLUMBIA, MO 100 376
FITCHBURG-LEOMINSTER, MASS. 99 957
BURLINGTON, NC 99 319
LAREDO, TX 99 258
BLOOMINTON, IND. 98 785
PANAMA CITY, FLA. 97 740
ELMIRA, NY 97 656
LAS CRUCES, N. MEX. 96 340
DUBUQUE, IOWA 93 745
BRYAN-COLLEGE STATION, TX 93 588

























SAN ANGELO, TX 
BANGOR, MAINE 
MIDLAND, TX 
IOWA CITY, IOWA 
GREAT FALLS, MONT. 
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